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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
JEANETTE OSGUTHORPE, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : Case No. 890219-CA 
JERRY OSGUTHORPE, : District Court No. D87-4967 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority 14(b) 
oooOooo 
RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The Respondent, Jeanette Osguthorpe, through her counsel on 
appeal Kent M. Kasting, Esq., of Dart, Adamson & Kasting, petitions 
this Court pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals for a rehearing of an issue raised by Respondent in her 
brief on appeal based upon the reasons set forth below. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT AND CERTIFICATION 
This Petition is based on the fact that this Court's opinion 
in the above matter fails to address and overlooks an issue raised 
by Respondent in Point VIII of her Brief. 
Counsel for Respondent hereby certifies that this Petition is 
brought in good faith and not for delay. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Dr. Osguthorpe appealed the trial court's decision and claimed 
at least five errors. Mrs. Osguthorpe responded to each of those 
claims of error arguing that each was without merit and further 
requesting that she be awarded her attorney's fees and costs on 
appeal. On March 19, 1990, this Court issued its per curiam 
opinion affirming the trial court's decision in all respects. The 
opinion, however, does not address Mrs. Osguthorpe's request for 
her attorney's fees on appeal as raised in Point VIII of her Brief. 




MRS. OSGUTHORPE IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF HER 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS INCURRED IN 
SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDING DR. OSGUTHORPE'S APPEAL 
Dr. Osguthorpe's appeal has now been determined to have no 
merit. The trial court's decision was affirmed in all respects. 
Point VIII of Mrs. Osguthorpe's Brief requested that this Court 
award her her attorney's fees and costs associated with the appeal. 
When an appeal is shown to be without merit, the Respondent 
has the right to request this court to award her attorney's fees 
and costs on appeal. As the Utah Supreme Court properly concluded 
in Carter v. Carter, 584 P.2d 904 (Utah 1978): 
However, the defendant argues that 
inasmuch as the plaintiff was unwilling to 
abide by the trial court's judgment and that 
she has been put to the necessity of defending 
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this appeal, the plaintiff should have to bear 
the costs thereof, including reasonable 
attorney• s fees for her counsel. We agree with 
the reasonableness and propriety of her request 
[Id. at 906] 
See also Ehninaer v. Ehninqer, 596 P.2d 1104 (Utah 1977). 
Likewise, the Utah Court of Appeals has regularly been willing 
to award a spouse fees on appeal when that spouse is required to 
defend an appeal which is found to be without merit. In Mauqhn v. 
Maughn, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989), the wife Paulette, was 
required to defend an appeal filed by her husband. She requested 
an award of attorney's fees on two basis. First, that the appeal 
was frivolous and second, that she could not afford to respond to 
the appeal. This court rejected her claim that the appeal was 
frivolous, however, accepted her argument that her need justified 
an award of her fees on appeal. In so doing, this Court stated: 
Although not particularly well articulated, 
Paulette suggests an alternative basis for 
awarding her fees and costs incurred on appeal. 
She claims she cannot afford to respond to the 
appeal and that since the trial court awarded 
her attorney fees, we should do likewise. 
Attorney fees on appeal may be granted in the 
discretion of the court in conformance with 
statute or rule Management Services Corp. v. 
Development Assoc. . 617 P.2d 406, 408 (Utah 
1980). Utah Code Ann. Section 30-3-3 (1984) 
provides that either party to a divorce action 
may be ordered to pay the adverse party to 
prosecute or defend the action. This includes 
attorney fees incurred on appeal. See, e.g., 
Carter v. Carter. 584 P.2d 904 (Utah 1978); 
Marks v. Marks. 98 Utah 400, 100 P.2d 207 
(1940); Hendricks v. Hendricks. 91 Utah 564, 
65 P.2d 642, 643 (1937). In view of our 
affirmance and the record evidence of her 
financial need, we exercise our discretion and 
award Paulette attorney fees on appeal. 
The judgment of the trial court is 
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affirmed. The case is remanded for the purpose 
of determining and awarding to Paulette 
attorney fees reasonably incurred on appeal. 
Id. at 162, 163. 
See also Richie v. Richie, 123 Utah Adv. Rpt. (Utah App. filed Dec. 
13, 1987.) 
Here, the record reflects Mrs. Osguthorpe does not have 
substantial assets and has a very limited income. On the other 
hand, Dr. Osguthorpe is a successful doctor of veterinary medicine, 
has access to substantial assets sufficient to allow him to 
purchase new vehicles, pay his own attorney's fees and pursue this 
appeal. Fairness requires that Mrs. Osguthorpe not be required to 
deplete her limited assets in demonstrating that this appeal is 
without merit. She requests that this court grant her Petition for 
Rehearing, award her attorney's fees on appeal, and remand the 
matter to the trial court for a determination of those fees and an 
appropriate entry of judgment against Dr. Osguthorpe. 
POINT II 
THE FEES AND COSTS WHICH MRS. OSGUTHORPE 
INCURRED ON APPEAL WERE SUBSTANTIAL AND SHE 
DOES NOT HAVE THE MEANS TO PAY THEM 
The following is a summary of the attorney's fees and costs 
which Mrs. Osguthorpe incurred in connection with this appeal: 
Attorney's Fees 
33.6 hours partner time at $100 per hour = $3,360.00 
5.0 hours clerk/paralegal time at $40 per hour = $200.00 
$3,560 Total attorney's and 
clerk/paralegal fees 
through March 19, 
1990, the date of 
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this Court's Opinion 
and does not include 
fees incurred in 
connection with this 
P e t i t i o n for 
Rehearing. 
Costs 
Printing - Respondent's Brief $158.61 
Trial and Hearing Transcript 309.00 
Total costs $467.61 
Mrs. Osguthorpe received minimum amounts in terms of alimony 
and child support, i.e., $150 per month alimony for five years and 
$600 per month child support ($150 per child). She has limited 
means to support herself and four minor children. She was awarded 
only half of the attorney's fees she requested at trial. Dr. 
Osguthorpe has paid nothing toward those fees. She now should not 
be required to also bear all of the fees necessary to demonstrate 
that Dr. Osguthorpe's appeal was without merit. The record 
presently before this court reflects the requisite need to justify 
an award of Mrs. Osguthorpe's attorney's fees and costs on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Osguthorpe was the successful party on appeal. She was 
required to respond to Dr. Osguthorpe's appeal and demonstrate that 
the trial court committed none of the errors that Dr. Osguthorpe 
claimed had occurred. She has limited means to support herself and 
her four children and, consequently, she should be awarded the fees 
and costs which she has now incurred in connection with the 
original appeal as well as the fees and costs she has now incurred 
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in connection with the filing of this Petition for Rehearing and 
the matter should be remanded to the trial court for a 
determination of those fees and entry of judgment against Dr. 
Osguthorpe for all such fees. 
Respectfully submitted this ^ % day of March, 1990. 
DARTfy/AD^ISON & JOLTING 
'u 
tent M. Kastyhg 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify I caused four true and correct copies of the 
Petition for Rehearing and/or Clarification to be hand-delivered 
to the following counsel of record on the <?P; day of March, 1989: 
David S. Dolowitz, Esq. 
Joy M. Douglas, Esq. 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
Jeanette Osguthorpe, 
Plaintiff and Respondent/ 
v. 
Jerry Osguthorpe/ 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 890219-CA 
F I L E D 
WARM 1990 
Third District/ Salt Lake County a^^ rkofih#court 
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson u*h c*urt * Appeals 
Attorneys: David S. Dolowitz and M. Joy Douglas, Salt Lake 
City/ for Appellant 
Kent M. Kasting, Salt Lake City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Garff, Billings, and Davidson. 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant/ Jerry Osguthorpe, appeals from the trial 
court's findings of fact/ conclusions of law and divorce 
decree. On appeal/ he claims the trial court's findings of 
fact regarding alimony and child support are unsupported by the 
evidence and the trial court erred in allocating the parties1 
resources, failing to award him the gifts his father gave to 
him during the marriage/ and requiring him to pay plaintiff* s 
attorney fees. We affirm. 
The parties were married in 1974 and separated in 1988. 
Four children, who at the time of the divorce ranged in age 
from eight to twelve, were born as issue of the marriage. 
Prior to the marriage/ both parties essentially completed their 
undergraduate degrees. In 1974/ defendant began veterinarian 
school/ and his father paid for tuition and books. While 
defendant was in school/ plaintiff worked as a waitress and 
cashier. In 1977/ defendant received his degree and began 
working in his father's veterinary clinic. At trial, defendant 
testifiedTthat he was a consultant for his father and received 
$2,000 per month. Additionally, defendant stated that he 
receives $350 per month rental income. After taxes and 
business expenses, defendant testified that his net income was 
$1/192 per month and his monthly living expenses were 
$2,049.60. 
Plaintiff testified that she had a college education with 
an outdated teaching certificate. She worked as a cashier and 
waitress while defendant was in veterinarian school and was a 
housewife and mother from 1977 until the parties1 separation. 
At the time of trial, she was employed as an insurance claims 
processor, earning a net wage of $770 per month. She testified 
that she earned $160 from rental property and her monthly 
living expenses were $2,027. 
During the marriage, defendant's father provided the 
parties with $18,500 for a downpayment on their home on Chris 
Lane. He also gave them various cash gifts, including a 
$10,000 Christmas gift in both 1982 and 1983, a $5,000 
Christmas gift in 1985, and a $1,000 Christmas gift in both 
1986 and 1987. 
The court found that defendants testimony indicated a 
net monthly income of $1,192.80, including $350 per month from 
rental property. However, based on a review of all the 
documents, the court found that defendant understated his 
income or was underemployed. The court also found plaintiff 
had a net rental income of $160, and a net monthly salary of 
$770 due to her employment as an insurance claims processor. 
Plaintiff's monthly expenses, the court found, were $2,027. 
The court noted that it had received conflicting testimony 
regarding whether the parties' tax returns accurately reflected 
the amount of money available to meet the family's needs and 
found that the tax returns understated the actual net income 
available to the parties during the marriage for family and 
living expenses. The court also found that plaintiff assisted 
defendant in completing his education by working, caring for 
the home and raising the children. Based on those facts, the 
court ordered defendant to pay plaintiff $150 alimony per month 
for a period of five years, and $1 per year for an additional 
five year period, or until such time as plaintiff remarries, 
cohabits or dies, whichever occurs first. In addition, the 
court ordered defendant to pay child support of $150 per month 
per child. 
With regard to the parties' property, the court awarded 
plaintiff the home on Hillrise Circle which plaintiff purchased 
prior to the marriage. In addition, plaintiff was awarded 
exclusive^use and occupancy of the parties' home on Chris Lane, 
subject to defendant's non-interest bearing equitable lien in 
the amount of $22,500. The court further found that 
defendant's father's cash gifts, including the $18,500 
downpayment on the Chris Lane home were intended by defendant's 
father as a gift to both parties for their mutual use and 
benefit during the marriage. Lastly, the court ordered 
defendant to pay $3,939.65 of plaintiff's attorney fees. 
I. ALIMONY 
Defendant claims the trial court's alimony award is based 
on erroneous findings of fact regarding defendant's income. 
Defendant asserts the trial court erred in failing to enter a 
specific finding regarding defendant's income and in finding 
defendant was undercompensated or underemployed. Defendant 
contends that instead of entering an alimony award based on 
speculation, the court should have made a finding and entered 
an alimony award based on the evidence. He also claims his 
alimony and child support award leave him with $442 per month, 
an insufficient amount on which to support himself. 
Trial courts have broad discretion in awarding alimony. 
Davis v. Davis. 749 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1988). We will not 
disturb the trial court's alimony award so long as the trial 
court exercises its discretion within the standards set by the 
court. JsL* In determining alimony, the trial court must 
consider three factors: 1) the financial conditions and needs 
of the receiving spouse; 2) the ability of the receiving spouse 
to produce a sufficient income for him or herself; and 3) the 
ability of the responding spouse to provide support. Schindler 
v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 90 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). If the 
trial court considers these factors, this court will not 
disturb the alimony award unless such a serious inequity has 
resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. Id. 
With regard to plaintiff's financial conditions and 
needs, the court found that plaintiff had a net monthly income 
of $770, received $160 per month from rental property, and had 
$2027 in monthly expenses. The court also reviewed plaintiff's 
ability to produce a sufficient income for herself in stating 
that plaintiff assisted defendant in completing veterinarian 
school by working and caring for the house and children. The 
court also found that plaintiff has a college education with a 
teaching certificate but that her certificate was not presently 
renewed. At the time of trial, although plaintiff was 
employed, her employment would soon end. However, the court 
found that but she is capable of finding good, gainful 
substitute employment. 
Regarding defendant's ability to provide support, the 
trial court found that defendant testified he received $2,000 
per month from his employment as a veterinarian and an 
additional $350 per month from barn rental. After taxes and 
business expenses, defendant claimed to have a net monthly 
income of $1,192.80 and monthly expenses of $2049.60. The 
court reviewed the testimony and the tax returns of the parties 
and found that defendant receives more monthly income than that 
reflected on his exhibit. Further, the court found that 
defendant is employed by his father and was either overpaid 
when he began his employment or underpaid at present. In 
determining the amount of alimony to award, the court stated 
that defendant has the ability to earn more than his present 
income and has chosen to be employed by his father at a lower 
salary. Also, the court stated that the tax returns, which 
indicated a yearly adjusted gross income of between $15,000 and 
$21,000 from 1982 to 1987, appear to understate the parties' 
income during the marriage. Based on these facts, the court 
awarded plaintiff $150 monthly alimony for five years. After 
five years the court reduced alimony to $1 per year for five 
years, until plaintiff remarries, cohabits or dies, whichever 
occurs first. 
We find no error in the trial court's failure to make a 
specific finding regarding defendant's income in this 
circumstance. The trial court found that defendant was not 
being candid as to his actual current income or was 
purposefully underemployed. We defer to the trial court's 
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. Utah R. Civ. 
P. 52(a); Riche v. Riche, 123 Utah Adv. Rep. 31, 31 (Ct. App. 
1989). Given the evidence in the record, it was well within 
the court's discretion to determine that defendant was either 
earning more than the evidence indicated or had the ability to 
earn more money. We therefore will not disturb the trial 
court's alimony award. 
II. CHILD SUPPORT 
Similarly, defendant argues the trial court erred in 
awarding plaintiff monthly child support of $150 per child 
without entering a specific finding regarding defendant's 
income. Defendant claims the trial court failed to consider 
all of the factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7 (Supp. 
1989) in accordance with Jefferies v. Jefferies. 752 P.2d 909, 
911 (Utah-Ct. App. 1988). 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1989), the trial court has 
broad equitable power to order child support, taking into 
account the needs of the children and the ability of the parent 
to pay. Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985). 
The trial courtfs finding of fact will not be overturned unless 
they are clearly erroneous. Jefferies, 752 P.2d at 911. 
••Failure of the trial court to make findings on all material 
issues is reversible error unless the facts in the record are 
•clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a 
finding in favor of the judgment.1M Acton v. J.B. Deliran. 737 
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella v. Bauoh, 660 P.2d 
233, 236 (Utah 1983)). Further, section 78-45-7 enumerates the 
following material factors that the court must consider in 
setting prospective support: 
(a) the standard of living and situation 
of the parties; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the 
parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn: 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(f) the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for 
the support of others. 
Jefferies, 752 P.2d at 911. 
Defendant claims the trial court erred in failing to make 
specific findings on all of the factors. However, the court 
made findings regarding the relative wealth and income of the 
parties, their respective abilities to earn, and the children's 
mother's monthly expenses to provide for the children*s needs. 
Further, the evidence in the record indicates that defendant 
was thirty-seven at the time of trial, while plaintiff was 
thirty-five. Defendant again claims the court erred in failing 
to enter a specific finding regarding defendants income. 
Without such a finding, defendant claims, the court cannot 
determine an appropriate level of child support. We disagree. 
The trial court considered the evidence and assessed the 
credibility of defendant's testimony. Given the evidence, the 
court determined that defendant was either understating his 
actual income or had chosen employment which paid less than he 
could otherwise earn. We defer to the trial court's assessment 
that defendant had an ability to earn more than he purported to 
earn and find no abuse of discretion in the court's award of 
child support in accordance with that assessment. 
III. GIFTS 
Defendant also contends the trial court erred in failing to 
award him gifts his father gave to him during the marriage 
while returning to plaintiff her premarital property. 
Defendant claims entitlement to various cash gifts and an 
$18/500 loan his father made available to the parties for a 
downpayment on the Chris Lane home. Because defendant's father 
testified that the gifts were intended for his son and not the 
parties jointly, defendant claims the court should have awarded 
him those gifts. 
There is no fixed formula for determining a division of 
property in a divorce action. Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d 
1144, 1146 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The trial court has wide 
discretion in adjusting financial and property interests, and 
its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity. Ifi. 
Absent a showing of a clear and prejudicial abuse of 
discretion, we will not interfere with a property award. 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 123 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
Section 30-3-5 (1989), provides: "When a decree of divorce 
is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property, and parties." In making an 
"equitable" division, trial courts should generally award 
property acquired by one spouse by gift and inheritance during 
the marriage to that spouse together with any appreciating or 
enhancement of its value unless: 1) the other spouse has 
contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of 
that property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it, 
or 2) the property has been consumed or its identity lost 
through commingling or exchanges or where the acquiring spouse 
had made a gift of an interest in the property to the other 
spouse. Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 
1988). However, in making equitable orders pursuant to section 
30-3-5, the court has consistently concluded that the trial 
court is given broad discretion in dividing property, 
regardless of its source or time of acquisition. Burke v. 
Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). 
Defendant claims that because the gifts were intended for 
him, the trial court erred in failing to award him those gifts 
in accordance with Mortensen. However, the trial court found 
the gifts were intended for both parties and we will not 
overturn the court's factual findings unless they are clearly 
erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). The record indicates that 
although 'Sefendant•s father testified that the $18,500 
downpayment and the other cash gifts given during the marriage 
were solely for his son, plaintiff testified that she always 
believed the gifts were for both parties. In addition, both 
defendant and his father testified that, with one exception, 
the gifts were made in the form of checks made payable jointly 
to both defendant and plaintiff. The one check that was made 
out to defendant only was made at about the time of the 
parties' separation. The trial judge stated from the bench 
that the past history of gift giving as compared to the gift 
given at the time of the separation indicated that defendant's 
father intended the previous gifts to be for both parties. In 
light of the evidence in the record, the court's finding that 
the cash gifts were intended for both parties is not clearly 
erroneous. Thus, Mortensen, which sets forth a test for gifts 
given to one spouse during the marriage, is inapplicable. 
Further, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's 
decision not to award defendant those gifts. 
IV. INTEREST 
Defendant also claims the trial court failed to award him 
interest on his equitable lien on the Chris Lane property 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-4 (1986). 
According to section 15-1-4 (1986), all judgments, other 
than those rendered on a lawful contract, shall bear interest 
at the rate of 12% per annum. In addition, the trial court in 
a divorce proceeding cannot stay statutory accrual of interest 
on a judgment for unpaid child support. Stroud v. Stroud, 758 
P.2d 905, 906 (Utah 1988). However, an equitable lien, unlike 
a judgment, only gives the lienholder a right to collect the 
debt out of the charged property. Citizens Bank v. Elks Blda., 
N.V., 663 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1983). A judgment, on the other 
hand, is "the final consideration and determination of a court 
on matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding." Crofts 
v. Crofts, 21 Utah 2d 332, 445 P.2d 701, 702 (1968). 
The decree awarded plaintiff exclusive use and occupancy of 
the Chris Lane home subject to a non-interest bearing equitable 
lien in favor of defendant for one-half of the present equity 
in the home. The court stated that the lien amount should be 
$22,500 and should be paid to defendant when plaintiff 
remarries, cohabits, sells the home, moves from the home, or 
when the youngest child reaches the age of majority, whichever 
occurs first. The equitable lien awarded defendant has not yet 
been reduced to judgment. Thus, defendant was awarded an 
equitable lien to which interest does not attach under section 
15-1-4. We therefore affirm the trial court's award to 
defendant of a non-interest bearing equitable lien on the 
parties' property for $22,500. 
V. ATTORNEY FEES 
Finally, defendant maintains the trial court erred in 
awarding plaintiff attorney fees because there was insufficient 
evidence of need and reasonableness. To recover attorney fees 
in a divorce proceeding/ the movant must demonstrate that the 
award is reasonable and that the need of the requesting party 
compels the award, Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820, 832 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Factors for determining reasonableness 
include the necessity for the number of hours utilized, the 
reasonableness of the rate charged in light of the difficulty 
of the case and the result accomplished and the rates commonly 
charged for similar services in the community. id. 
* In this case, there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate 
plaintiff's need, given her income and financial 
responsibilities. In addition/ plaintiff's attorney profferred 
that he had been practicing in the area of domestic relations 
law for fifteen years and was familiar with the rates charged 
in domestic actions. He also stated that his hourly rate was 
$100 per hour and he considered that to be reasonable. He 
itemized the rates charged for associates, paralegals and 
clerks and stated that those rates were reasonable in his 
professional opinion. Plaintiff's attorney reviewed his time 
records and estimated the total fee and cost award would be 
$7,869.30. The court found that plaintiff's evidence of 
attorney fees in the amount of $7,879.30 was reasonable and 
necessary. The court further found that plaintiff does not 
have the ability to pay the fees and that defendant has the 
ability to pay a portion of plaintiff's fees and costs. 
Finally, the court found that the hourly rate is reasonable and 
consistent with the rate for similar services in the community 
and the hours expended were necessary. 
In light of the evidence in the record, we find sufficient 
evidence of reasonableness and need regarding the attorney 
fees. Accordingly, we affirm the award of attorney fees. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
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